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
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
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## RESEARCH REPORT


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UNITED STATES POLICY FOR SOUTHERN AFRICA

By COLONEL PAUL E. STEIN

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UNITED STATES POLICY FOR SOUTHERN AFRICA

by

Paul E. Stein  
Colonel, USAF

A RESEARCH REPORT SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY  
IN  
FULFILLMENT OF THE RESEARCH  
REQUIREMENT

RESEARCH ADVISOR: Dr. Thomas P. Ofcansky

MAXWELL AIR FORCE BASE, ALABAMA

March 1986

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AIR WAR COLLEGE RESEARCH REPORT ABSTRACT

TITLE: United States Policy for Southern Africa

AUTHOR: Paul E. Stein, Colonel, USAF

Southern Africa is a region that is of major (not vital) interest to the United States. It is a region dominated by South Africa, possessing vast mineral resources and torn by armed conflict. This paper outlines a proposed US national security policy for Southern Africa with emphasis upon detailed policy recommendations for dealing with South Africa, Angola, Mozambique and Namibia. Removing the South African system of "apartheid" is a key element in solving not only the problems in South Africa, but are key to the stability of the entire region.

## BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH

Colonel Paul E. Stein was born in Monroe, Louisiana, and was commissioned in the Air Force in 1966 upon graduation from the Air Force Academy. After coaching football at his alma mater for a year, he was assigned to, first, Spangdahlem AB and then Bitburg AB, Germany for four years of duty in Special Services. Returning to the U.S. for a short stay at Barksdale AFB, Louisiana, he then attended Florida State University, where he earned an MBA. From 1974 to 1977, he was assigned to TAC's E-3A (AWACS) Operational Test and Evaluation Team stationed at the Boeing Company, Seattle, Washington. He then transferred to HQ TAC for duty in the E-3A Directorate, DCS/Ops. His last five and one-half years were spent in the Pentagon, initially in the Directorate of Operational Requirements, DCS/RD&A and the past three years in Legislative Liaison on the Secretary of the Air Force's staff. His most recent job was that of Chief, Weapons System Liaison.

## United States and Southern Africa

The paper describes a proposed US national security policy for Southern Africa. That policy will then be discussed and assessed with regard to the national and international environment. Lastly, this paper will consider how the proposed policy supports overall US national interests and objectives.

Southern Africa, includes the states of Angola, Zambia, Mozambique, Zimbabwe, Botswana, Namibia, Swaziland, Lesotho, and South Africa. It is an area dominated by a regional powerhouse (South Africa) that is endowed with vast mineral resources and real economic might that provides the hub of the entire area's economy and infrastructure. The rest of the region is heavily dependent upon South Africa's ports, industries, railway networks and financial institutions. To a lesser extent, South Africa needs the markets, labor, and transport systems of its neighbors. (15:2) It is a region torn by conflict with "warfare or armed dissidence of one form or another in South Africa, Zimbabwe, Mozambique, Namibia, Lesotho and Angola." (12:2) Conflict that ruins economies, destroys agriculture, restricts trade, and causes political disruption. The area's final characteristic is the South African system of

"apartheid", or the systematic denial of political and economic rights to the country's black majority.

It is an area where there are no US vital national interests (4:60) defined as "when serious harm likely will result unless strong measures, including the use of conventional military forces, are employed to counter an antagonist's provocative action." (8:41) There are few that would argue that our interests in Southern Africa are currently such that the administration would propose and receive support from the people and Congress to introduce US conventional military forces into the region. Proposing military action is difficult to justify in many regions, but this region in particular due to its long distance from the US and the relatively uninformed nature of the American people about the entire region. Rather, US interests are more accurately characterized as "major" or those that "when a country's political, economic, and social well-being may be adversely affected by external events or trends." (8:41) Using these definitions of interests the policymakers job is one of looking at a region and then identifying the intensity of our interest in that region i.e., the US stake before reacting.

Four levels of intensity or interests are generally accepted: survival, vital, major and peripheral. (8:41)

An important point to remember is that interests or intensities can change over time or in response to changing world conditions and events. Witness the Persian Gulf region evolving from an area of major interest during the early 1970s to vital during the oil boycott and after and now hovering somewhere between major and vital. But for purposes of this paper, Southern Africa is an area of major interest to the US and as such, this policy currently would not consider using conventional military forces.

With that background, it is useful to review briefly, current US objectives for the region since they form the basis for the policy. Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, Chester Crocker outlined these basic objectives in congressional testimony as: seeking to "strengthen communication between the countries of Southern Africa in order to ease tensions, bolster regional security, and encourage negotiated solutions and peaceful change"; to create "conditions which will lead to Namibia's independence at the earliest possible date"; believing that "apartheid" is morally unacceptable," to encourage those elements within South Africa seeking constructive change and widen the governmental and economic base to include all elements of the states of the region which wish us the same." (6:1) These policy objectives and the ones that will build upon these to form this paper's policy support US overall national

interests of (1) reducing and restraining Soviet expansion, (2) retaining access to vital mineral resources necessary for the economic well being of the US and Western allies, (3) creating and maintaining a peaceful and favorable world order and (4) promoting basic American values of democracy and human rights. (6:1) All are interrelated and all are factors making Southern Africa an area one of major interest to the US.

US policy towards South Africa forms the underpinning of our overall policy in the entire region. This is primarily because the region's other countries are dependent upon South Africa for their own economic well being. South Africa has the markets for their goods, controls the roads and the railroads to those markets, has a near monopoly on the port facilities that allows access outside the region, and provides most of the job opportunities for the vast majority of the region's citizens. South Africa seeks to retain this economic stranglehold and US policy over the years has contributed to this situation. Since Africa in general and Southern Africa in particular historically have been relatively lower priority areas for US policy, what attention and aid we have been providing has naturally gone to the western-oriented, economically prosperous and mineral rich country in the area. Unfortunately this is also the country steeped in racial repression. Therein lies the most important task for future

US policy, to end the system of "apartheid" within South Africa and help build a multi-racial society and government that is hopefully pro-west, but at least nonaligned. Continued US support for the "apartheid" regime not only harms our relations with other African countries and undermines our relations with black nations worldwide, but impacts relations with the non-black Third World countries who see it as a continuation of colonialism. Continued support for South Africa also provides the Soviets with a ready-made propaganda device and is morally repugnant to the majority of American people. The US cannot direct the end of "apartheid" from Washington DC, but by exercising political, economic and psychosocial power it can work to bring about its peaceful demise. America must exert all forms of moral suasion and political pressure on the white regime, continue denying military and economic aid and create and nurture, within the responsible black community, conditions of economic opportunity and training in organizational and political affairs. Perhaps above all the US must convince the black community within South Africa, throughout Africa, and in the US as well, that the efforts are aimed at creating equal opportunity for all citizens of South Africa. This same assurance is necessary for the non-blacks as well to motivate them to change without fear of post solution retribution and retaliation.

This is not a policy of economic sanctions and isolation, since that can cause South Africa to collapse, blacks and whites together. Neither is it a policy of overthrow of the Botha government although it recognizes the imperative of that government being replaced by a more moderate white government on the way to a future multi-racial and perhaps eventually an all black government. The alternative to a gradual transition from the Botha regime to some form of multi-racial government is continuing and escalating violence that may destroy the country's economic viability. The government has most of the military might, but armed civil disobedience is growing, becoming more violent and threatens to tear the country apart from within. There are also reports that many white South Africans are refusing to enter military service choosing instead to evade the draft authorities within the country or in some cases, seeking exile outside South Africa rather than serve further encouraging internal violence and possible long term military problems. South Africa's 4.7 million whites cannot control forever its 22 million blacks particularly when those blacks are gaining more worldwide support each day. It is remotely possible to envision a situation where a disgruntled military and police force could slowly lose their appetite for violence and killing of unarmed or lightly-armed black civilians and refuse to carry out government orders. This situation is

not totally unlike some aspects of the recent Phillipine situation during the period following the election and before Marcos left. But whatever develops, the US must be part of the solution or else it will be isolated by whatever government comes about and it is a real possibility that eventually a black government will come about.

Many like Bishop Desmond Tutu and Winnie Mandela argue that a black government is the only solution to the South African situation and the sooner the better. Arguments like these either discount or ignore the impact of tribalism and tribe loyalty as a devisive factor in the South African political scene. "The land is divided among 10 separate black tribal nations, officially called homelands, none of which constitutes an overall majority. The notion is a fundamental canon of the ideology on which the nation's separation has been built." (4:1) There is little cohesion among these tribal groups and in fact there has been much violence recently among the tribes. A primary rivalry is between the nearly six million Zulus and the Xhosa-speaking tribes. The principle Zulu party, Inkatha, led by Chief Mongosuthu Gatsha Buthelezi has been accused by its foes for furthering "apartheid" goals "since Chief Buthelezi has accepted the position of Chief Minister of the Kwazulu homeland." (4:5) The African National Congress (ANC), whose leadership is primarily Xhosa, has opposed the homelands

solution, and has been a leading critic of Buthelezi. Buthelezi has also rejected the use of violence as a means to effect political change and opposes US economic sanctions against South Africa claiming they will harm blacks more than the white regime. These positions are opposite those held by the ANC and thus cause for additional friction. Tribalism has been scorned by some prominent black nationalists and many urban blacks reject tribal classification as a protest against the laws that foster "apartheid" and established the 10 tribal homelands dividing the blacks by tribe. White government officials argue that the experience elsewhere in Africa has taught them that efforts towards tribal integration have led to violence. They refer to Biafra's bloodshed during their attempted secession from Nigeria during the late 1960s and the rivalries in neighboring Zimbabwe between the Shonas and Ndebeles as examples of why "tribes should be permitted to maintain their separate identities." (4:5)

Recent events in South Africa seem to make the government's case. On Christmas day, 59 people were killed in clashes between Zulus and Pondos (Xhoso-speaking) and other conflicts have occurred throughout the country. (4:5) The primary political significance of the more intense tribal conflicts is the division between the ANC and its supporters that support violence directed from outside South Africa's borders and the more moderates like Buthelezi that favor

peaceful negotiation with the regime as the best hope for a solution. The recent upsurge in tribal violence and the recent relatively peaceful government change-over in Lesotho to one more aligned to South Africa would seem to support Buthelezi's position that quicker and more peaceful solutions can be attained by working with the South African government than by fighting it. It is clear however, that any solution that fails to consider potential conflicts and violence between blacks as closely as considering those conflicts between blacks and non-blacks will be doomed to failure.

On the other hand, the US cannot afford a Marxist-Leninist government takeover in South Africa which has been the pattern in other African countries like Angola, Mozambique, and partially in Zimbabwe. The Soviets have been quick to provide aid and assistance to one or more of the warring factions in these civil wars while the West ignores or avoids the conflict until in most cases, it is almost too late. The Soviet aid substantially shifts the military balance and soon there is a Soviet supported regime in control, like the current regime in Angola, Frelimo in Mozambique, and Mugabe's forces in Zimbabwe. The West has been forced to sit by and watch this situation unfold, a circumstance that would be disastrous in South Africa. The US must stay active and not let those that argue for a "hands-off" position to prevail because South African mineral

resources are considered by some to be vital to the US. For example, 1,500 pounds of chromium are used to build one jet engine like the type that powers the F-16. South Africa has 84 percent of the known reserves, (9:10) and South Africa supplies 55 percent of American's imports. (13:49) The other major source is the Soviet Union. Similar statistics exist for manganese and platinum group metals, both equally important to our economic well being. (13:49) Takeover of the government and these mineral assets by a Marxist-Leninist black regime besides having a regional historical precedence, is a real possibility since the most prominent and organized black activist group within the region is the ANC, which is dominated by Communists. US policy must account for the ANC and other groups both inside and outside the country since they represent the few organized black political forces that will wield political power and must be accommodated or co-opted as part of any multi-racial rule.

When and if this multi-racial rule comes, another reason to prevent it from being a Marxist-Leninist government is South Africa's strategic location. South Africa sits astride a major sea lane of communication between the Persian Gulf/Indian Ocean and Western Europe, a route which carries over one-half of Europe's oil supplies. A pro-Soviet government in South Africa could lead to Soviet use of port facilities to support interdiction of these sea

lanes. (11:60) It is possible that if South Africa did become Communist, did deny the US access to the critical mineral resources of the region and did block the sea lanes of communication cutting off Europe's oil supply, that Southern Africa would suddenly become an area of vital interest to the US. While the US has a strategic mineral reserve that would in most cases sustain it for some time, the Europeans have no such protection for their oil supply. Any long term denial of this resource would be devastating to the Western economies. As part of this policy, efforts need to continue to fill the mineral reserve, seek suitable substitutes for those critical minerals and encourage fossil fuel conservation. These actions will retain policy flexibility and help prevent Southern Africa from becoming a "vital" interest to the US should the rest of this policy not be successful.

Perhaps the best reason for this proposed policy toward South Africa is that it is morally right, and the citizens of the US will support it. "President Reagan has called 'apartheid' 'repugnant.'" (14:4) Equal opportunity and human rights for all citizens is a basic tenet of American beliefs and has been a cornerstone of our policy for years and while we may not be able to impose these precise beliefs on the South Africans, the US must strive to move them toward an African version of these principles. America must

continue to provide incentives for businesses to offer educational, housing and other benefits for black employees, an effort that has been worth more than \$100 million over the past few years. (15:3) A need exists to expand the assistance that has been provided "to train leaders in the black community to help them work more effectively for change in their own society." (15:3) In this regard, the basis of the policy for US businesses operating in South Africa is adherence to the "Sullivan Principles." Dr. Leon Sullivan, a black clergyman from Philadelphia, outlined these principles in March 1977 after consultation with the Carter administration, and they have been embraced and indorsed by scores of American businesses with economic ties in South Africa. These principles call for: "(1) non-segregation of races in all eating and working places; (2) equal and fair employment practices for all employees; (3) equal pay for all employees doing equal and comparable work; (4) a development training programme which will prepare blacks in substantial numbers for supervisory, administrative, clerical and technical jobs; (5) an increase in the number of blacks in management and supervisory positions; and, (6) improvement of the quality of employees' lives outside the work environment in such areas as housing, transportation, schooling, recreation and health." (1:4203-4204) These are very positive principles

to keep an economy viable while at the same time working toward ending 'apartheid' and creating conditions for peaceful change.

South Africans must change South Africa. US interest lies in helping create the economic and political climate to allow change to occur peacefully. The current wave of violence only serves to harden the white regime and hasten the day of possible violent overthrow, fuel economic and political chaos, and create vacuums for Communists to fill, none of which is in US interests, the region's interests or South Africa's interests.

Once the South African policy is successfully implemented, the rest of the region is much less complex. A moderate, multi-racial government in Pretoria would be much less likely to continue supporting rebels in Angola and perhaps in Mozambique trying to overthrow the Marxist-Leninist regimes in those countries. On the other hand, those Marxist-Leninist regimes in addition to their partial dependence on South Africa economically, have already shown a willingness to have relations with the US with a promise for even warmer relations once the South African situation is settled.

Proposed US policy toward Angola is a two phased approach. As a hedge against South Africa's total collapse and the possible failure of our proposed policy there, the US must continue to support with limited economic and military

aid, Jonas Savimbi and his National Union for the Total Liberation of Angola (UNITA) in their fight against the Angolan regime of the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA). The MPLA is heavily supported by Soviet arms and is "propped up by more than 30,000 Cuban mercenaries and 12,000 Soviet and East Bloc advisers and personnel."

(10:23)

Savimbi's recent visit to the US for meetings with the President and other high government officials should assist the administration in securing Congressional approval for either covert or overt aid. Each form of aid has its pro's and con's but either will be effective. Support for Savimbi coupled with continuing some level of trade with the MPLA (we are Angola's major export market and their third most important source of imports) might seem dichotomous on the surface, but it is consistent with our South African policy. The goal is not to destroy the Angolan economy but only to pressure the government to redirect their policy.

Support for Savimbi's military efforts keeps pressure upon the MPLA to form a coalition with UNITA which now defacto governs about one third of Angola. (13:23) UNITA has demanded that, as a minimum, before any talks can be completed for a coalition between the MPLA and UNITA, that all foreign troops must be withdrawn, including the Cubans and Soviets on the MPLA side and presumed South African

troops supporting Savimbi. Withdrawal of the Cubans and reduction of Angola's reliance upon Soviet arms would obviously be in our national interest. The Soviets currently have port access and operate Bear H reconnaissance flights out of Angola. This military foothold in the South Atlantic is worrisome to military planners trying to protect these sea lanes of communications. (16:123)

Perhaps the most complex issue regarding US policy toward Angola is what to do regarding trade with the MPLA regime, particularly oil. The Angolan economy has suffered dramatically since independence. Angola was formally a food exporter but now imports most of its food. Prior to independence "Angola had a balanced export mix of coffee, oil, diamonds and food. Today most of its interior has reverted to subsistence agriculture." (2:28) Ninety percent of Angola's foreign exchange earnings now come from oil (nearly \$2 billion annually) and nearly 75 percent of the Angolan oil is being pumped by a subsidiary of the Chevron Oil Company. Chevron is in the midst of a two year, half-billion-dollar investment program to improve its capability. (2:31) Falling world oil prices, provide an excellent opportunity to put even more economic pressure on the MPLA. The Administration is currently pressuring Chevron to moderate or terminate its activities in Angola as a gesture of support of US national interests with an obvious residual effect of

strengthening Savimbi's position vis-a-vis the MPLA. This, coupled with continuing lower world oil prices and other diplomatic efforts to prohibit Western oil producers from taking over our oil producing capability, could dramatically reduce the foreign exchange available to the MPLA. Since the war against Savimbi is reported to be consuming up to 75 percent of the national budget, severe reductions in oil revenues would complement military and economic support of Savimbi's efforts. (2:31) Less money to feed and house the Cuban mercenaries and pay for Soviet weapons could force the Angolan government to seriously consider expelling the Cubans and negotiating a solution that includes UNITA in some coalition government. A simple policy for Angola, keep UNITA going and economically pressure the economy until the MPLA moderates, kicks out the Cubans and broaden the base of government to include Savimbi.

A similar but slightly different policy is proposed for Mozambique. Mozambique is run by a staunch but practical Marxist-Leninist regime whose relations with the Soviet Union have begun to sour. Soviet support for both Mozambique and Angola is not free but requires both regimes to pay in hard currency for the arms they receive because Southern Africa is not a vital national interest for the Soviets either. Mozambique has realized that economic development is dependent on trade and the prime source of trade in the area is

with and through South Africa. Therefore in March 1984, the two countries signed the Nkomati Accord whereby South Africa agreed to stop supporting the Mozambique National Resistance Movement (MNR) seeking to overthrow the Mozambique regime and, in return, Mozambique vowed to stop harboring and training the Soviet controlled ANC members seeking the overthrow of South Africa's government. (3:13) This truce has allowed Mozambique to start to rebuild its economy which has nearly collapsed under the combined weight of drought and mismanagement. (3:15)

This situation is now ripe for US economic aid, trade and assistance. Earlier this year, the Reagan administration began courting Mozambique's President, Samora Machel and sought congressional approval for economic assistance (other than previously approved famine relief) to Mozambique, but was rebuffed primarily by conservatives who reeled at the thought of supporting a Marxist-Leninist regime. Continued efforts are warranted and could help turn Mozambique toward non-alignment. Support for the MNR is not in order since, in contrast to UNITA in Angola which has broad public support, the MNR seems to have toppling the existing regime as their only goal. (7:20) Lack of South African support will seriously damage the MNR cause, and we should continue to encourage South African moderation.

There have been reports that South Africa is not living up to the Nkomati Accord but continue to supply the MNR, albeit on a reduced basis, arms and other support to continue their struggle. There is little concrete evidence to tie South Africa to any blatant and overt military support of the MNR but as long as the MNR remains active, South Africa will be suspected and Mozambique will continue to be branded as naive by other Black nations for signing the agreement. (12:608)

Accusations of violations prompted a recent trip (26 February 1986) to the Mozambique capital by South African Foreign Minister Roelof F. Botha to reassure the Machel regime that South Africa continued to abide by the agreement. The South African regime has previously admitted to what it calls "technical" violation of the Nkomati Accord, but insists that it is now abiding by it. (5:4) The MNR is a loose knit organization and even President Machel is said to have stated that "probably no more than 30 percent of the MNR fighters were responsive to orders from the group's central headquarters." (12:608) Other senior Mozambique officials have acknowledged that it would take at least two years to deal with the rebels, acknowledging that the fighting would not stop with the drying of the ink on the agreement. (11:608) Moreover, there is evidence that just prior to the Accord being signed, South Africa rushed MNR personnel and large

amounts of arms into Mozambique to restore the stocks of war supplies. (12:607) As such, continued MNR strength is not surprising.

The possibility of Soviet support for the MNR cannot be discounted. Instability in the region, particularly on the border with South Africa serves Soviet interests. And with Machel visiting and talking with President Reagan and trying to turn the country toward a more non-aligned status, the Soviets might see opportunity for playing both sides, not unlike what they did early in the Angolan Civil War.

Violations aside, the significance of the Accord is major in that it enhanced South Africa's stature, allowed Mozambique to pay more attention to economic development, undermined the ANC politically and greatly reduced the flow of ANC guerrillas into South Africa. It is argued that this latter factor will reduce South Africa's ability to claim that its threats and enemies are primarily external rather than within the country itself. As such there may be a clearer recognition by South Africa's white regime that the problem is instead within and a corresponding recognition by the ANC and others opposed to "apartheid" that the struggle can only succeed from within South Africa, not from the neighboring states. (12:609)

Solution to the Namibian problem may be the trigger that not only removes Cuban troops from Angola but also

allows South Africa to concentrate on solving problems within its own borders rather than diverting time and resources to the Namibian struggle. Namibian independence is mandated by UN Security Council Resolution 435 and is designed to create "conditions which gave all participants reasonable confidence that their security interests would be protected." (6:2) These participants include South Africa who has controlled Namibia since after WW I (it was a mandated territory under the League of Nations), Angola, who sees Namibia as both a sanctuary for UNITA forces seeking to overthrow their government and a launching point for South African incursions into Angola, and the native Namibian's themselves. US policy has been and should continue to tie the withdrawal of South African forces from Namibia with a similar withdrawal of foreign forces (Cuban) from Angola. Concurrent with this withdrawal, an interim government made up of proportional membership from each of the rival factions would rule until free, UN supervised elections can be held in Namibia. The US must continue to press this policy and attempt to overcome Angolan and the Namibian rebel group SWAPO (South-West African People's Organization) resistance by pushing harder for a UN security force to support the interim government. Inclusion of US military forces in this UN security force may be desirable since Cuban, Soviet, East

German, and North Korean troops are already on the ground in Angola. This would also provide US troops on scene to provide military assessments back to Washington as well as be in place and familiar with the region, should the later introduction of US military forces be required. Cessation of hostilities is a prerequisite to joining and keeping the rival factions in an interim government. Namibia's economy is closely tied to South Africa and hence is fairly healthy by regional standards. Namibian independence is the first in a series of dominoes that could fall and lead to resolution of many of the region's problems. "Agreement on a timetable for Cuban troop withdrawal from Angola is the one issue remaining in the overall settlement package." (11:4)

Proposed policies for the remaining countries of the region are to provide modest amounts of economic aid and to work to end the armed conflicts in the region. If the region becomes reasonably free from military actions and armed insurgencies and the situation in South Africa stabilizes, countries like Zimbabwe, Zambia, Botswana, Swaziland, and Lesotho may begin to prosper as trade and stability dominate the area. Conversely, if these preconditions do not exist, these countries probably will continue to limp along and any specialized policy will not be effective.

Our national interests are served by a peaceful, economically viable, free from Soviet influence region in

Southern Africa. American objectives in the region are to end "apartheid" in South Africa peacefully, to build regional security and economic prosperity and to bring about an independent Namibia. The US must encourage political solutions to the area's conflicts and in particular, must actively participate in building political awareness and experience within South Africa's black community. Trained black leadership is sorely lacking and is absolutely necessary to any multi-racial solution to South Africa's problem and to preclude possible imposition of outside control. Political pressure must be sustained on South Africa in both bilateral and multilateral arenas particularly by encouraging other western democracies like Britain for support.

Economic development is necessary throughout the region. Aid must be targeted toward the black communities in South Africa, Mozambique, and UNITA in Angola. There are apparently enough arms in the area since the entire region is seemingly engulfed in conflict. The only military aid needed is for UNITA. That, along with increased economic disorder in oil revenue, will help keep the pressure on the Angolan regime to remove the Cuban troops. Cuban troop withdrawal is the key factor to solving Namibian independence, Angolan non-alignment and perhaps will even assist in stopping South Africa's internal strife by allowing its government to concentrate more on the homefront.

The overriding feature of this policy is that it will take time. Building black leadership skills within South Africa that will enable blacks to take their place in a multi-racial regime will take both time and enormous efforts. The US and the rest of the world must not become impatient but must stay the course and not be diverted by any proposed "quick fix" solutions.

In summary, Southern Africa is currently not considered vital to US interests and as such will not receive an inordinate amount of attention and resources. On the other hand, solution to the South Africa strife is clearly in the US national interest since one can envision a situation of Soviet controlled regimes in Angola, Mozambique, Namibia, and perhaps even South Africa. These regimes would be in position to deny access to critical mineral resources which would seriously damage the American economy and those of the Western allies. These regimes could disrupt the sea lanes of communication around the tip of Africa which carry most of Europe's oil which would be particularly damaging to the European economies. Severe economic problems both at home and in Europe coupled with relentless pressure from our European and Persian Gulf allies to free the sea lanes could raise the intensity of the region in the US policymakers eyes and drive Southern Africa into the vital interest category where conventional military forces might be used. These

aforementioned policies are designed as much to prevent that from happening as they are to solving the regions more basic problems.

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